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:1. 
FOREWORD 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to 
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational 
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine 
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance 
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility 
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and 
photographic analysis of mission events. 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, 
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying 
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In 
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video 
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space 
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also 
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment 
of the mission.
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Shuttle Mission STS-52 was launched at 1:09 p.m. local 10/22/92
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The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 21 October 1992. The detailed walkdown of 
Launch Pad 39B and MLP-3 also included the primary flight 
elements OV-102 Columbia (13th flight), ET-55 (LWT 48), and 
B1054 SRB's. There were no vehicle or facility anomalies. 
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 22 October 1992. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no ice conditions outside of the established data 
base. The External Tank exhibited light condensate on the TPS 
acreage. The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical leak sensor detected no 
significant hydrogen leakage during the cryoload. No unusual 
vapors or cryogenic drips were visible during tanking, stable 
replenish, and launch. An 8-inch long dogleg crack was present 
in the forward surface TPS covering of the -Y ET/SRB vertical 
strut cable tray near the longeron closeout interface. There 
was no offset and no ice/frost in the crack. The crack occurred 
in an area where a stress relief cut had been eliminated by 
design at the factory. The condition was acceptable for launch 
per NSTS-08303 and CR SO41254C. 
Leak detectors #23 and #25 located within the GUCP cavity 
. indicated the presence of a hydrogen leak external to the vent 
line from cryogenic loading slow fill through stable replenish. 
Readings peaked during vent valve open cycles. The leak reached 
a maximum value of 44,000 ppm thirty minutes into topping then 
remained at 20-30,000 ppm during replenish. The suspected area 
of leakage was at the tank side teflon seal, which mates with 
the 7-inch GH2 vent quick disconnect probe. More than usual 
amounts of ice and frost covered the uninsulated areas of the 
GUCP around the-7-inch line. Post launch inspection and retest 
of the GSE hardware did not reveal any anomalies. 
A debris inspection of Pad 39B was performed after launch. No 
flight hardware was found with the exception of one FRSI plug. 
EPON shim material on the south holddown posts was intact but 
slightly debonded on the HDP #1 and #2 shoes. There was no 
visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south 
holddowri posts. No frangible nut/ordnance fragments were found. 
The GH2 vent line had latched properly. A preliminary inspec-
tion of the GUCP 7-inch line sealing surface was performed in 
an effort to determine the cause of the hydrogen leak detected 
during cryogenic loading. No obvious discrepancies were noted. 
Post launch disassembly and retest of the hardware also 
revealed no anomalies. A dimensional analysis of the bellows is 
still in work, but the IPR documenting the condition will most 
likely be closed as an Unexplained . Anomaly (UA). Damage to the 
facility overall was minimal.
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A total of 134 film and video items were analyzed as part of 
the post launch data review.
	 No major vehicle damage or lost 
flight hardware was observed that would have affected the 
mission. No ordnance debris fell from any of the HDP DCS/stud 
holes.	 All T-O umbilicals operated properly.
	 GUCP disconnect 
from the External Tank was nominal.
	 There was no external 
evidence of the hydrogen leak at the 7-inch QD.
	 On-orbit 
imagery from the ET/ORB umbilical cameras and the flight crew 
handheld photography revealed nominal SRB and ET separations. A 
section of the red purge seal was missing from the aft inboard 
corner of the LH2 umbilical.
	 This section of material adhered 
to the Orbiter side of the umbilical interface and was still 
attached after Orbiter landing. A 5-inch divot to substrate was 
present in the LH2 tank acreage at XT-1399 adjacent to a previ-
ously sanded area. Some of the left bipod jack pad TPS closeout 
was missing. Foam was also missing from the aft outboard corner 
of the LH bipod ramp closeout.
	 A possible divot may have 
occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout just aft 
of the LH bipod spindle. Otherwise, there were no divots in the 
flange closeout -Y+Z and +Y+Z quadrants where divots have 
typically occurred on previous tanks. At least 20 small pieces 
of TPS were missing from intertank stringers forward of the LH2 
tank-to-intertank flange/bipod area. No metal substrate /primer 
was	 visible.	 Film analysis	 also showed orbiter performance, 
landing gear extension,	 wheel touchdown, 	 and vehicle rollout 
after landing were normal. 
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger .AF after 
retrieval. The RH frustum had 18 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners 
and one 1.5-inch diameter area of missing TPS in the -Y+Z 
quadrant.	 The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 27 MSA-2 
debonds over fasteners. The RH forward skirt was missing no TPS 
but did have two acreage debonds. All Debris Containment System 
(DCS) plungers were seated properly. Pieces of EPON shim were 
missing from HDP #3 and HDP #8. The material was lost prior to 
water impact (sooted/charred substrate)
A detailed post landing inspection of OV-102 was conducted on 
1 November 1992. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 290 hits, 
of which 16 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The 
Orbiter lower surface had a total of 152 hits, of which 6 had a 
major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on these numbers 
and comparison to statistics from previous missions of similar 
configuration, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was 
much greater than average and the number of hits one inch or 
larger was less than average. All three ET/Orbiter separation 
devices (EO-1, 2, and 3) and all ET/ORB umbilical separation 
ordnance retention shutters functioned properly. No flight 
hardware was found on the runway below the umbilicals when the 
ET doors were opened.
. 
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The majority of tile V070-395093-016 was missing from the base 
heat shield between SSME #2 and #3. This tile, which covers a 
calorimeter, sustained an in-plane failure, leaving the strain 
isolation pad and an attached layer (approximately 0.3 inches 
thick) of densified tile material in the cavity. An In-Flight 
Anomaly (IFA) was taken. In addition to the missing tile, an 8 
by 6 by 0.5-inch tile damage site was present on the base heat 
shield adjacent to SS #1 (at approximately the 7:00 o'clock 
position) . This damage site appeared to have been caused by a 
dense object and may have been caused by the lost tile. This 
flight marked the fourth use of the Orbiter drag chute. The 
drag chute appeared to have functioned nominally. All drag 
chute hardware was recovered and showed no signs of abnormal 
operation. The only unexpected flight hardware found on the 
runway was a tile gap filler from the aft fuselage sidewall. 
A variety of residuals were present in the Orbiter window 
samples and indicated sources such as Orbiter TPS, SRB BSM 
exhaust residue, natural landing site products, organics, and 
paint. HRSI tile damage site samples revealed only the 
presence of Orbiter TPS materials, although a new type of TPS 
coating residue was detected. This residual sampling data does 
not indicate a single source of damaging debris as all of the 
other materials have been documented previously in post-landing 
sample reports. The residual sample data also gave no indica- 
tion of debris trends when compared to previous mission data. 
A total of ten Post Launch Anomalies, but no IFA candidates, 
were observed during the STS-52 mission assessment. 
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
The Ice/Debris/TPS/Photographic Analysis Team briefing for 
launch activities was conducted on 21 October 1992 at 0830 
hours with the following key personnel present: 
S. Higginbotham NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
B. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical Systems 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
A. Oliu NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
J. Cawby LSOC - SEC Supervisor, ET Processing 
J. Blue LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
M. Jaime LSOC - SEC ET Processing 
M. Dean LSOC - SEC ET Processing 
W. Richards LSOC - SEC ET Processing 
Z. Byrns NASA - JSC Level II Integration 
S. Copsey MMC
	
- MAF ET TPS Testing/Certif 
J. Stone RI	 - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
K. Mayer RI	 - LSS Vehicle Integration 
M. Nowling MTI	 - LSS SRN Processing 
R. Kretz MTI	 - LSS SRM Processing
is S. Otto MMC	 - LSS ET Processing
These personnel participated in various team activities, 
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and 
contributed to reports contained in this document.
. 
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.2.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 21 October 1992 from 0930 - 1030 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-3 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-102 Columbia (13th flight), ET-55 
(LWT 48), and B1054 SRB's. Documentary photographs were taken 
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage 
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryoload 
and launch, tygon tubes for hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and 
LD55 were installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. The tygon 
tubes are intended to remain in place during cryogenic loading 
and be removed by the Ice Team during the T-3 hour hold. 
There were no significant vehicle anomalies. 
There were no vehicle or facility debris issues. The MLP deck 
and areas under the raised decks were swept again prior to 
launch to remove small debris items, such as sand, rust flakes, 
and paint chips. No items were entered in S0007, Appendix K. 
is
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Pre-flight configuration of the bipod jack pad closeouts, the S intertank TPS acreage, and the LH2 tank flange closeout. Post ET separation photography would reveal the loss of TPS from the 
intertank acreage and the LH bipod jack pad closeout. 
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LH (-Y) vertical strut/cable tray TPS covering prior to 
S cryogenic fuel loading. Cracks have appeared in this general area after cryoload due to the elimination of a stress relief 
gap as part of a manufacturing process enhancement change. 
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STS-52 was launched at 17:09:39.063 GMT (1:09:39 p.m. local) 
on 22 October 1992. 
3.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 22 October 1992 from 0620 to 0800 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 72.6 Fahrenheit 
Relative Humidity: 	 54.9 % 
Wind Speed:	 15.1 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 049 Degrees 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning 
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature 
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
as shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
0	 3.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS 
thruster paper covers and water spray boiler plugs were intact. 
Less than usual ice/frost was present at the SSME heat shield-
to-nozzle interfaces. Condensate was present on all SSME heat 
shields, but the base heat shield tiles were dry. An infrared 
scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat 
shield or engine mounted heat shields. No unusual vapors 
originated from inside the SSME nozzles. 
3.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH 
SRB case temperatures between 68 and 75 degrees Fahrenheit (F) 
In comparison, temperatures measured by a hand-held, Minolta! 
Land Cyclops spot radiometer ranged from 67 to 75 degrees F and 
the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEl) measured 
temperatures ranging from 72 to 75 degrees F. All measured 
temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. 
The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk- Temperature (PMBT) supplied 
by MTI was 78 degrees F, which was within the required range of 
44-86 degrees F.
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Figure 1. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
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Figure 2. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
SUMMARY DATA 
TIME: 0620	 0800 EST 
. 
.
rl 
'2 
72 
70 
1 
11
EGG/V - 343C
3.4 EXTERNAL TANK
	
. 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 0445 to 1245 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3.
	 - 
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation 
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
There was no condensate or ice/frost accumulations on the L02 
tank ogive and barrel sections. There were no TPS anomalies. 
The tumble valve cover was intact. The pressurization line and 
support ramps were in nominal configuration. The portable STI 
measured surface temperatures that averaged 68 degrees F on the 
ogive and 60 degrees F on the barrel section. In comparison, 
the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 65 
degrees F on the ogive and 61 degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE 
predicted temperatures of 60 degrees F on the ogive and 55 
degrees F on the barrel. 
The intertank acreage TPS was dry. No frost spots appeared in 
the stringer valleys at the LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank 
flanges. More than usual ice/frost accumulations, but no 
unusual vapors, were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. 
Both the portable STI and the Cyclops radiometer measured an 
average surface temperature of 71 degrees F on the intertank. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, 
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. 
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged .
 60 
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 65 degrees F on the lower 
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured 
temperatures that averaged 61 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank 
and 67 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank; SURFICE predicted 
temperatures of 56 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 61 
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipods, bipod jack pad 
closeouts, PAL ramp, cable tray/press line ice/frost ramps, 
longerons, thrust struts, manhole covers, or aft dome apex. 
Some ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper 
strut fairing expansion joints. Ice/frost covered the lower EB 
fittings outboard to the strut pin hole with condensate on the 
rest of the fitting. The struts were dry. 
An 8-inch long dogleg crack was present in the forward surface. 
TPS covering of the -Y vertical strut cable tray near the 
longeron closeout interface. The 3/8-inch wide crack exhibited 
no offset and was not filled with ice or frost. The appearance 
of the crack was expected due to the elimination of the stress 
relief gap at the factory. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets.
	 0 
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There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of 
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of 
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge 
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had 
occurred during tanking,. stable replenish, and launch. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with 
condensate. 
The usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the top, aft, 
and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier. 
Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro canister and 
plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost was present on both the aft 
and forward outboard pyrotechnic canister closeout bondlines 
indicating thermal shorts. The amount and location of the 
ice/frost was acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 
criteria. A 3-inch ice/frost finger had formed on the cable 
tray vent hole. No ice or frost had formed on the 17-inch 
flapper valve actuator access port foam plug closeout. No 
unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, 
stable replenish, and launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle without contacting Orbiter tiles. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of six OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented an apparent crack at the upper outboard 
pyro canister TPS closeout aft bondline on the LH2 ET/ORB 
umbilical. Although the area was covered by ice and frost, the 
condition was acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 002 documented ice/frost formations on the LH2 ET/ORB 
umbilical aft pyro canister TPS closeout upper bondline. The 
condition was acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 003 documented an 8-inch dogleg crack in the forward 
surface TPS covering of the -Y vertical strut cable tray at the 
intersection to the ET/SRB cable tray transition fairing. The 
3/8-inch wide crack exhibited no offset and was not filled with 
ice or frost. The condition was acceptable for launch per 
NSTS-08303 and CR SO41254C. 
Anomaly 004 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical pyro . canister purge vents, purge 
barrier (baggie), plate gap purge vents, cable tray vent hole, 
and LH2 recirculation line bellows. The ice/frost formations 
were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 	 0 
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Anomaly 005 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost fingers on 
the L02 ET/ORB umbilical pyro canister purge vents. The ice and 
frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 006 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. The ice/frost 
formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
35 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the ML? 
deck or in the SRB hoiddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0 
umbilicals. Typical accumulations of ice/frost were present on 
the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. 
Leak detectors #23 and #25 located within the GUCP cavity 
indicated the presence of a hydrogen leak external to the vent 
line from cryogenic loading slow fill through stable replenish. 
Readings peaked during vent valve open cycles. The leak reached 
a maximum value of 44,000 ppm thirty minutes into topping then 
is of at 20-30,000 ppm during replenish. The suspected area 
of leakage was at the tank side teflon seal, which mates with 
the 7-inch GH2 vent quick disconnect probe. More than usual 
amounts of ice and frost covered the uninsulated areas of the 
GUCP around the 7-inch line. Post launch inspection and retest 
of the GSE hardware did not reveal any anomalies. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. No icicles had formed on the GOX 
vent ducts.
15
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No condensate, ice, or frost accumulation was present on the

ET L02 tank and intertank TPS acreage 
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Li.q1i condensate, but no ice OL frost accumulation, was present
on the LH2 tank acreage and aft dome 
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A hydrogen leak external to the vent line occurred from 
cryogenic loading slow fill through stable replenish. More than S usual amounts of ice and frost covered the uninsulated areas of the GUCP around the 7-inch line. Post launch inspection and 
retest of the GSE hardware did not reveal any anomalies. 
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An 8-inch long dogleg crack appeared in the LH (-Y) vertical 
strut/cable tray forward facing TPS covering near the longeron S closeout interface. A stress relief cut in the TPS to allow for structural movement had been deleted by design. This condition 
was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria 
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had formed on the top and outboard 
sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical/purge barrier. Normal amounts 
of ice had accumulated on the plate gap and pyrotechnic S canister purge vents, and the LH2 recirculation line bellows. Ice was present on the forward outboard pyrotechnic canister 
closeout bondline indicating a thermal short (arrow) 
F-
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.Typical in size, ice/frost fingers had formed on the aft plate 
gap purge vent and LH2 umbilical cable tray vent hole. The lack S of ice or frost on the 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam plug closeout indicated a tight seal and nominal 
closeout.
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0	 4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of the ML?, FSS, pad surface, and 
pad acreage was conducted on 22 October 1992 from Launch + 2 to 
4 hours. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found with 
the exception of one FRSI plug, which most likely originated 
from the Orbiter base heat shield. 
EPON shim material was intact on all south hoiddown post shoes 
but was slightly debonded on HDP #1 and #2. There was no visual 
indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south holddown 
posts. No ordnance fragments were found in the south HDP stud 
holes. All of the north HDP doghouse blast covers were in the 
closed position and exhibited normal plume erosion. The SRB aft 
skirt purge lines were in place but slightly damaged. The SRB 
T-0 umbilicals exhibited minor damage. 
The GOX vent arm, OA, and TSM's showed the usual minor amount 
of damage. The GH2 vent line latched on the eighth tooth of the 
latching mechanism. There were no loose cables, but the north 
latch appeared to have contacted the north saddle stabilizer. 
The damage from this contact was minimal and has occurred on 
previous launches. A preliminary inspection of the GUCP 7-inch 
line sealing surface was performed in an effort to determine 
the cause,
 of the hydrogen leak detected during cryogenic 
. loading. No obvious discrepancies were noted. Post launch 
disassembly and retest of the hardware also revealed no 
anomalies. A dimensional analysis of the bellows is still in 
work, but the IPR documenting the condition will most likely be 
closed as an Unexplained Anomaly (UA). The GH2 vent line 
exterior surface showed typical signs of SRB plume impingement. 
The ET intertank access structure also sustained typical plume 
heating effects. 
Damage to the facility appeared to be less than usual. Items 
found on the pad included: 
1. A two foot long cable tray rail and a 6-inch long bolt 
on the FSS 95 foot level near the elevator. 
2. A total of three 5-inch diameter rubber disks on the 
FSS 175 and 215 foot levels. 
3. A metal hasp on the FSS 95 foot level deck near 
slidewire basket #4. 
4. A 10-inch long metal tool (chisel) on the FSS 255 foot 
level near the elevator door. 
5. A piece of sheet metal in the SRB flame trench 50 feet 
north of the ML?.
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All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on 
the FSS 195 foot level. Several of the baskets showed signs of 
plume impingement effects. 
An inspection of the beach from UCS-10 to Titan complex 40, the 
beach road, the railroad tracks, and.the water areas around the 
pad and under the flight path was completed. No flight hardware 
was found. 
MLP-3 was configured with overpressure sensors at the top of 
both TSM' s, at the bottom of both SRB exhaust holes, and at the 
bottom of the SSME exhaust hole. All sensor readings were 
consistent with previous launches and within nominal limits 
with the exception of the sensor in the LH SRB exhaust hole. 
This sensor malfunctioned. 
Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for 
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris 
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separation 
(due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). Most of 
the signal registrations were very weak and often barely detec-
table, which generally compares with the types of particles 
detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 74 particles 
were imaged in the T+138 to 324 second time period. Forty of 
the particles were imaged by only one radar, 27 particles were 
imaged by two radars, and 7 particles were imaged by all three 
radars. The number and signal strength of the detected 
particles was comparable to the STS-47 mission (73 particles). 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9.
. 
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S Plume erosion of the south SRB hoiddown posts was typical. EP)N shim material was intact but slightly debonded from the 
hoiddown post shoes.
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S	 All of the north hoiddown post doghouse blast covers were 
in the closed position and showed typical plume erosion 
26
COLOR
0	 5.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
Post Launch Anomalies observed in the Film Review were 
presented to the Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and 
vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are listed in 
Section 9. 
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 104 film and video data items, which included forty 
videos, thirty-nine 16mm films, twenty-one 35mm films, and four 
70mm films, were reviewed starting on launch day. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile 
appeared normal (RSS STI, C/S-2 STI, OTV 151, 170, 171). The 
hydrogen burn ignitors functioned normally (OTV 150, 170, 171). 
One streak was noted in the SS
	 #1 plume (E-2, 3, 19, 20). 
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice/frost to fall from 
the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Several of these particles from the 
outboard side of the LH2 umbilical contacted the aft sill of 
. the umbilical cavity, but did not appear to damage any tiles. 
There were no unusual vapors or cryogenic drips from the LH2 
and L02 ET/ORB umbilicals during tanking, stable replenish, 
ignition, or liftoff (OTV 109, 154, 163, 164, C/S-2 STI, E-4, 
5, 26) 
SSME ignition vibration and acoustics caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from four places on the base heat 
shield outboard of SSME #3 (E-17) and one place between SS #2 
and #3 (E-19) 
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine 
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous 
launches (E-76, 77). 
Light frost was present in the -Y ET GOX vent louver at the 
time of launch. There was no TPS damage to the ET nose cone 
acreage, footprint, or fairing (OTV 161). The ET "twang" of 
approximately 31 inches was typical (E-79). The ET nosecorie/ 
pressure spike returned to the 12 inch mark at T-0. 
The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and 
retracted properly (OTV 149, 150, 163). A yellow teflon GSE 
shim used for repairing the T-0 umbilical peripheral seal fell 
from the LH2 interface plate/disconnect area at T-0 (E-18). 
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GUCP disconnect from the External Tank was nominal (OTV 104).
	 0 There was no external evidence of the hydrogen leak at the 
7-inch QD. The GH2 vent line latched with no rebound (OTV 160, 
E-33) . Some slack was present in the static retract lanyard 
causing it to contact the RB leg of the carrier plate during 
latchback (E-41, 42, 48, 50) 
No ordnance debris fell from the HDP DCS/stud holes. There were 
no visual indications of stud hang-ups on any holddown posts. 
Separation of the SRB T-0 umbilicals from the aft skirts was 
nominal (EX2, EX3). 
Two pieces of thermal curtain tape were loose on the +Y side 
(90 degree location) of the RH SRB aft skirt (OTV 154) and one 
piece was loose on the LH SRB aft skirt near HDP #6 (E-31, 34). 
SRB north hoiddown post doghouse blast covers closed normally 
(E-15, 16). All MLP rainbirds operated properly (E-1, 4, 41, 
60, 62) 
Numerous debris particles, including pieces of SRB throat plug, 
were ejected upward out of the SRB exhaust holes. None of the 
objects contacted the vehicle, but ,
 some were drawn into the 
exhaust plumes by aspiration (E-1, 2, 14, 25, 26). 
Numerous particles, most likely small pieces of SRB propellant, 
fell out of the SRB plume during ascent (E-54, 59, 207, 222). 
Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after comple-
tion of the roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS 
thrusters and were identified as pieces of RCS paper covers. 
Other pieces of RCS paper covers were visible passing over the 
Orbiter wings (E-54, 207, 212, 222). 
A particle, first observed behind the left inboard e].evon, fell 
aft and reappeared as two pieces near the SRB BSM cluster at 
17:09:53.417 GMT (E-222). 
A particle was visible between SS #2 and #3 at 17:10:01.652 
GMT and appeared to be caught in the plume recirculation near 
the base heat shield. A particle, possibly the same, appeared 
outboard of SS
	
#2 at 17:10:01.795 GMT (E-54). 
Sunlight reflected off the LH SRB ETA ring (E-207, frame 41-
10) 
Flashes occurred in the SSME plume during ascent (E-54, 222). 
Movement of the body flap was similar to previous flights 
(E-207, 208, 212, 220) S 
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ET aft dome charring occurred early in ascent (OTV 148, TV 4B). 
This phenomenon is normal due to the lack of significant 
condensation on the aft dome at the time of launch. 
Exhaust plume recirculation, SRB plume tailoff, SRB separation, 
and the appearance of SRB slag particles before and after 
separation were nominal (TV 4B, 5, 13, 21B, E-54, 204, 205, 
207, 208, 212, 223) 
Frustum separation from the forward skirts and parachute 
deployment appeared normal. During reefing, one parachute was 
late in opening but reach full reef before nozzle severance 
(E-302) . Nozzle severance debris was typical. Water splash down 
was visible in E-302. 
. 
.
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Ankow 
 shim used for repairing the T-O umbilical 
peripheral seal fell from the LH2 interface plate/disconnect 
area at T-O.
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0	 5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew and thirty-six 35mm 
still images were obtained of the ET after separation from the 
Orbiter. OV-102 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: one 
35mm (60 still frames), one 16mm motion picture camera with 
10mm lens, and one 16mm motion picture camera with a 5mm lens. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have been a safety of flight concern. 
A piece pf dark material that appeared from an area behind the 
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray, fell aft, and broke into 
numerous smaller pieces appeared to be a thin layer of fire 
barrier material from the umbilical. 
SRB separation from the ET was nominal. Separation of the -Y 
ET/SRB upper and diagonal struts appeared normal. No loss of 
K5NA from the upper strut fairing was visible. No anomalies 
were observed on the LH SRB segment cases and joints, forward 
skirt, and frustum. 
Separation of the ET/ORB umbilicals appeared normal.. Numerous 
pieces of ice, frozen hydrogen, and small chunks of TPS drifted 
past the umbilical cameras. A small piece of foam with fire 
. barrier material attached floated by the camera. It most likely 
originated from the outboard side of the LH2 umbilical near the 
pyro canister closeout. A white cylindrical rough-edged object 
also drifted through the field of view and was most likely an 
ice finger from a forward purge vent tube inside the umbilical. 
Although not considered an anomaly, this type of ice formation 
had not been observed in umbilical separation films before. 
ET structural separation from the Orbiter appeared nominal. The 
BSM burn scars on the L02 tank were typical. No anomalies were 
observed on the nosecone, L02 tank acreage, PAL ramps, and aft 
dome acreage. Plume recirculation and aft dome heating caused 
the usual charring and "popcornirig" of the NCFI foam. 
Erosion/ablation/charring of TPS on the aft surfaces of the 
ET/ORB umbilical cable trays and the vertical strut/cable trays 
was typical. 
Frozen hydrogen adhered to the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical interface. 
Small pieces of foam were missing from the vertical and 
horizontal sections of the umbilical cable tray, the umbilical 
support strut TPS covering, and the forward outboard pyro 
canister closeout. A section of the red RTV seal was missing 
from the aft inboard corner of the LH2 umbilical. This section 
of material adhered to the Orbiter-side of the umbilical inter-
face and was still attached after Orbiter landing. S
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Pieces of TPS were missing from the L02 ET/ORB umbilical cable 
tray vertical and horizontal sections. Possible TPS damage had 
occurred at the forward inboard corner of the L02 umbilical. 
Erosion and "popcorning" on the L02 feedline flange closeouts 
and the +Y thrust strut flange closeout was typical. 
A light colored area that may be a possible divot was visible 
on the ice/frost ramp at XT-2028. 
A 5-inch divot to substrate was present in the LH2 tank acreage 
at XT-1399 adjacent to a previously sanded area. 
Some of the left bipod jack pad TPS closeout was missing. Foam 
was also missing from the aft outboard corner of the LH bipod 
ramp closeout. 
A possible divot may have occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank 
flange closeout just aft of the LH bipod spindle. Otherwise, 
there were no divots in the flange closeout -Y+Z and +Y+Z 
quadrants where divots have typically occurred on previous 
tanks. 
At least 20 small pieces of TPS were missing from intertank 
stringers forward of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange/bipod 
area. No metal substrate/primer was visible. 
A small piece of debris inside the aft compartment drifted into 
the field of view between the camera lens and the umbilical 
view port.
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A small piece of foam with fire barrier material attached 
.	 floated by the camera (arrow) . It appeared to originate from 
the upper outboard side of the LH2 umbilical at the pyrotechnic 
canister closeout.
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Structural separation of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared 
normal. Some TPS was lost from the upper outboard pyro canister 
closeout at separation. Rough appearance of the umbilical top 
and outboard sides was caused by blistering of the fire barrier 
material. A section of the red purge seal was missing from the S aft inboard corner of the LH2 umbilical. This section of material adhered to the Orbiter side of the umbilical interface 
ind was still attached after Orbiter landing. 
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View from the L02 ET/ORB umbilical separation camera showed 
possible TPS damage at the forward inboard corner of the L02 
umbilical. Pieces of TPS were missing from the vertical and 
horizontal sections of the umbilical cable tray. 
37 
S 
.
n 
1^1 
.
A 5-inch divot to substrate was present in the LH2 tank acLeap 
at XT-1399 adjacent to a previously sanded area. Some of the 
left bipod jack pad closeout was missing. Foam was also missing 
from the aft outboard corner of the LH bipod ramp closeout. 
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At least 20 small pieces of TPS were missing from intertank 
stringers forward of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange/bipod 
area. No metal substrate or primer was visible. There were no 
divots in the flange closeout -Y+Z and +Y+Z quadrants. Post 
flight (ascent) condition of the L02 tank/nosecone was nominal. 
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0	 5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 26 film and video data items, which included eleven 
-	 videos, nine 16mm high speed films, and six 35mm large format 
films, were reviewed. 
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and 
final approach appeared nominal. The landing gear extended 
properly. Left and right main landing gear touchdown was almost 
simultaneous. 
Drag chute was deployed just after breakover, but before the 
nose gear contacted the runway. Drag chute deployment appeared 
nominal. A slight crosswind blew the drag chute somewhat 
westward relative to the Orbiter and caused the nose to yaw 
eastward. Use of nosewheel steering and braking brought the 
vehicle back on runway centerline. 
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. There were no 
anomalies during rollout. 
. 
.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 26 October 1992 from 0800 
to 1100 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in 
good condition. 
6.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The RH frustum had 18 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and one 1.5" 
diameter area of missing TPS in the -Y+Z quadrant at the 336 
ring frame. Minor localized blistering of the Hypa].on paint had 
occurred predominantly along the 395 ring (Figure 4). All BSM 
aero heat shield covers were locked in the fully opened posi-
tion though the left two cover attach rings had been bent by 
parachute riser entanglement. 
The RH forward skirt exhibited no missing TPS, but did have two 
debonds. The first debond was located at approximately 240 
degrees, station 480, and measured 3.5" x 3" in size. The 
second debond was located at approximately 150 degrees, station 
470, and measured 2.5" x 1.5" in size. Both RSS antennae 
covers/phenolic base plates were intact and undamaged. Minor 
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on the forward ET/SRB 
attach point (Figure 5). No pins were missing from the frustum 
severance ring. The forward separation bolt and electrical 
cables appeared to have separated cleanly. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the 
FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting 
from severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. Two 
fasteners on the lEA cover were sheared by water impact. Two 
foam cavities, 1.6 x 0.5 x 1.3 inches and 1.3 x 0.4 x 0.7 
inches, were present in the forward-facing ETA ring TPS. One 
cavity was located near the systems tunnel side of the lEA; the 
second was located near the upper strut. The adjacent foam in 
these cavities will be analyzed in an attempt to determine if a 
debris impact was the cause. The upper strut fairing (milk can) 
was missing a 7" x 3" section of K5NA and the substrate was 
charred. 
All three aft booster stiffener rings sustained water impact 
damage. A 5" x 6" area of K5NA was missing from the center aft 
booster stiffener ring splice plate closeout. Though the 
remaining material showed signs of delamination, the surfaces 
were not sooted indicating the material was most likely lost at 
water impact.
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The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. Two 
divots, measuring 13" x 5" and 3" x 1", had occurred on the aft 
skirt acreage TPS just to the -Y side of the single BSM. Some 
of the material along the aft edge of the divots appeared 
sooted/charred. A third divot, measuring 2.5" x 1.5", had 
occurred between the single BSM and the -Y axis at station 
XB-1894 partially exposing two fastener head covers (Figure 6). 
Samples were taken from all three locations for laboratory 
analysis. K5NA was missing from all BSM nozzles. 
Approximately 50 percent of the EPON shim was missing from HDP 
#3 aft skirt foot. The substrate was sooted/charred indicating 
that the shim material was lost prior to water impact. All 
Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated properly. 
This was the eleventh flight utilizing the optimized link. 
. 
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of missing TPS near the pressure port (arrow) .	 All BSM aero 
heat	 shield covers were locked in the fully	 opened position 
though the left two	 cover	 attach rings	 had been bent by 
parachute riser entanglement.
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The RH forward skirt was missing no TPS, but did have two MSA-2 S debonds. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on the forward ET/SRB attach point. Both RSS antenna covers/TPS were 
intact and undamaged.
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Two cavities were present in the forward-facing ETA ring TPS. S Post flight analysis revealed no evidence of embedded debris or foreign material. The cavities had experienced a full ascent 
heat load and were most likely present prior to launch rather 
than an in-flight occurrence.
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S	 The upper strut fairing (milk can) was missing a 7" x 3" piece 
of K5NA. The substrate was charred.
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S Three divots, one of which exposed two fastener head covers, occurred on the aft skirt acreage TPS near the location of the 
booster separation motors (BSM's) 
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Close-up view of the 13" x 5" MSA-2 divot. Post flight analysis 
revealed a lack of high heat exposure, but did show signs of 
debris impacts followed by in-flight erosion. However, no 
foreign debris particles were detected in the remaining 
. material. The divot most likely occurred during descent since 
areas of MSA-2 within the divot were peeled upward toward the 
nosecone and exhibited forward fracture sooting. 
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This divot exposed two fastener head covers and a small area of 
substrate. Post flight analysis revealed no foreign debris or 
. high ascent heating effects. The divot was caused by a "smiley" 
starting aft of the fasteners during descent, which sooted the 
aft fracture surface before the MSA-2 broke loose. 
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0	 6.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LH frustum was missing no TPS, but had 27 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners and two MSA-2 acreage debonds. There was minor 
localized blistering of the Hypalon paint along the 395 ring 
frame (Figure 7). The BSM aero heatshield covers were locked in 
the fully opened position. 
The LH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The 
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact and undamaged 
(Figure 8). The forward separation bolt and electrical cables 
appeared to have separated cleanly. No pins were missing from 
the frustum severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon 
paint occurred near the ET/SRB attach point. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good 
condition. In general, minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS 
and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from 
severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SBB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
The upper strut fairing (milk can) was missing a 3" x 1" area 
of K5NA and the substrate was charred. All three aft booster 
stiffener rings sustained water impact damage. The aft booster 
.	 forward, center, and aft stiffener ring splice plate closeouts 
were intact and no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring exhibited localized 
delamination. The acreage TPS on the aft skirt was generally in 
good condition (Figure 9). 
A 6" x 2" piece of EPON shim was lost from HDP #8 aft skirt 
foot prior to water impact. All four Debris Containment System 
(DCS) plungers were properly seated. This was the eleventh 
flight utilizing the optimized link. 
[]
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'flie LH frustum was missing no TPS, but had 27 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners. The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked in 
the fully opened position.
58
OCNAL	 E
COLOR PHOTOGAPH
. 
S The Ui forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred in localized areas. 
Both RSS antenna covers/TPS were intact and undamaged. 
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S Post flight condition of the Lii aft booster. The ET/SRB aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. All 
three aft booster stiffener rings sustained water impact damage 
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C V A piece of the HDP #8 EPON shim was missing prior to water 
impact (sooted/charred substrate). 
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6.3 RECOVERED SRB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
Post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System (DCS) 
housings revealed an overall system retention of 99 percent and 
individual holddown post retention percentages as listed: 
% of Nut without
HDP # 2 large halves 
1 99 
2 99 
3 99 
4 99 
5 99 
6 99 
7 99 
8 99
% of Ordnance 
fragments % Overall 
94 99 
94 99 
94 99 
96 99 
94 97 
96 99 
96 99 
96 99
. 
S
STS-52 was the eleventh flight to utilize the new "optimized" 
frangible links in the holddown post DCS's. The link was 
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the 
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the 
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from 
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a 
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment 
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance 
debris. 
The Instafoam on the forward surface of the RH ETA ring 
exhibited two rectangular cavities (1.6 x 0.5 x 1.3 inches and 
1.3 x 0.4 x 0.7 inches) . Samples of adjacent foam were removed 
and analyzed at MSFC (ref USBI No. BLV-106-92'). No evidence 
of any debris or foreign material was found embedded in either 
cavity. Dark material removed from the bottom of the cavities 
was determined to be charred Instafoam similar to that found on 
the exterior foam surface. The report concluded the cavities 
had experienced a full ascent heat load and were most likely 
present prior to launch rather than an in-flight occurrence. 
MSA-2 adjacent to the two divots just to the -Y side of the 
single BSM was removed and analyzed at MSFC (ref USBI report 
No. BLV-107-92MP). The divots did not penetrate the entire 
thickness of the MSA-2 and no substrate was visible (0.12 inch 
depth maximum) . Microscopic examination revealed a lack of high 
heat exposure but did show signs of debris impacts followed by 
in-flight erosion. However, no foreign debris particles were 
detected in the divots. The report concluded the divots most 
likely occurred during descent since areas of MSA-2 within the 
divot were peeled upward toward the nose cone and exhibited 
forward fracture sooting.
62 
A third MSA-2 divot at station XB-1894 partially exposed two 
PP.1422 fastener head covers. Adjacent MSA-2 was removed and 
analyzed at MSFC (ref USBI report BLV-108-92MP). The substrate 
was exposed in a small area of the divot. Sooting on the aft 
fracture surface of the divot was darker than the forward 
surface. No foreign debris particles or high ascent heating 
effects were detected in the fracture surfaces. The report 
concluded the divot was caused by a "smiley" starting aft of 
the fasteners during descent, which sooted the aft fracture 
surface before the MSA-2 broke loose. 
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
1^1 
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0	 7..0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-102 (Columbia) was 
conducted on November 1-2, 1992, at the Kennedy Space Center on 
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) Runway 33 and in the Orbiter 
Processing Facility bay #1. This inspection was performed to 
identify debris impact damage arid, if possible, debris sources. 
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 290 hits, of which 16 had 
a major dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not 
include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to 
SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A 
comparison of these numbers to statistics from 35 previous 
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 
25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42 which had damage from known 
debris sources), indicates that the total number of hits is 
much greater than average but the number of hits one inch or 
larger is less than average. Figures 10-13 show the TPS debris 
damage assessment for STS-52. 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 152 hits, of 
which 6 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The 
distribution of hits on the lower surface does not suggest a 
single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of ice 
and Thermal Protection System (TPS) debris from random sources. 
The following table breaks down the STS-52 Orbiter debris 
damage by area:
HITS > 1"	 TOTAL HITS 
Lower surface 6 152 
Upper surface 4 83 
Right side 3 18 
Left side 0 15 
Right OHS Pod 0 12 
Left OHS Pod 3 10
TOTALS	 16	 290 
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered 
to be in excellent condition for a landing on the KSC runway. 
All three ET/Orbiter separation devices (EO-1,2, and 3) 
appeared to have functioned properly. All ET/Orbiter umbilical 
separation ordnance retention shutters were closed properly. No 
flight hardware was found on the runway below the umbilicals S	 when the ET doors were opened. 
.
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In general, damage to the base heat shield tiles was typical. 
However, the majority of tile V070-395093-016 was missing 
between SS #2 and #3. This tile, which covers a deactivated 
calorimeter, sustained an in-plane failure leaving the strain 
isolation pad and an attached layer (approximately 0.3 inches 
thick) of densified tile material in the cavity. An In-Flight 
Anomaly (IFA) was taken to document this discrepancy. In addi-
tion to the missing tile, an 8 by 6 by 0.5-inch tile damage 
site was present on the base heat shield adjacent to SSME #1 
(at approximately the 7:00 o'clock position). This damage site 
appeared to have been impacted by a dense object and may have 
been caused by the lost tile. 
Two Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket sacrifi-
cial panels were missing and two were nearly detached from 2:00 
to 4:00 o'clock around SSME #2. All of the remaining DMHS 
blankets were in excellent condition. 
Orbiter windows #2 and #5 exhibited light hazing. Windows #3 
and #4 had a few small streaks. Hazing on the other windows was 
less than usual. Surface wipes have been taken from Windows #1 
through #.8 and #11 for laboratory analysis (reference section 
8.0 for analysis results). A very large number of tile impact 
sites (seventy with two larger than one inch) were noted on the 
perimeter tiles around windows #1 through #6. Most all of these 
hits were small and shallow in depth and may have been caused 
by RTV used to bond paper covers to the FRCS nozzles, exhaust 
products from the SRB booster separation motors, ice/TPS debris 
from the External Tank L02 tank, or Orbiter TPS fragments (or 
any combination of the above). 
Samples of inclusions found in two tile damage sites on the 
Orbiter nose were taken for laboratory analysis (reference 
Figure 14 for sample locations and section 8.0 for analysis 
results) 
Runway 33 was inspected and swept by KSC EG&G SLF personnel on 
October 31, 1992 and all potentially damaging debris was 
removed. A post landing inspection of Runway 33 was performed 
immediately after landing. The only unexpected flight hardware 
found was a tile gap filler (V070-395052-175). This gap filler 
originated from the left aft fuselage sidewall. 
This flight marked the fourth use of the Orbiter drag chute. 
The drag chute appeared to have functioned nominally. However, 
a tile on the aft end of the vertical stabilizer stinger was 
damaged by the chute risers during deployment. Another tile, on 
the lower (-Z) RH edge of the drag chute compartment opening, 
was slightly damaged by separation of the chute compartment 
door. Similar damage has been observed after every previous use 
of the drag chute. All drag chute hardware was recovered and 
showed no signs of abnormal operation (reference Figure 15 for 
recovery locations)
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A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure the 
surface temperatures of three areas on the Orbiter (per OSD 
V09AJO.095). Twenty-eight minutes after landing the Orbiter 
Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) nosecap was 183 degrees 
Fahrenheit (F). Twenty-six minutes after landing the RH wing 
leading edge RCC panel #9 was 144 degrees F, and panel #17 was 
132 degrees F (reference Figure 16). 
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was 
much greater than average while the number of hits one inch or 
larger was less than average when compared to previous missions 
(reference Figures 17-19). The cause(s) for the much higher 
than usual total number of hits (in particular, the seventy 
hits around the perimeter of the forward facing windows) is 
still being assessed. It should be noted however, that the vast 
majority of these hits were very small and do not present a 
significant refurbishment issue. 
One factor that may be contributing to Orbiter debris damage is 
vehicle age. OV-102 has shown an increasing trend in the total 
number of debris hits sustained during each flight. This upward 
trend may be due to the effects of age on Orbiter TPS 
materials. Original and repaired TPS materials may become 
weak/loose due to the effects of thermal cycling and exposure 
to vibration/loading, creating potentially damaging debris. 
is	 six
landing debris damage sustained by OV-102 during the last 
 flights is shown in Figure 20. 
Orbiter Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9. 
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FIGURE 17: ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY 
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE 
HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS	 HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS 
STS-6 15 80 36 120 
STS-8 3 29 7 56 
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58 
STS-1 1 (41-B) 11 19 34 63 
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36 
STS-14 (41-U) 10 44 30 111 
STS- 17(41-43) 25 69 36 154 
STS-19 (51-A) 14 86 20 87 
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81 
STS-27 (51-I) 21 96 33 141 
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111 
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183 
STS-31 (61-8) 37 177 55 257 
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193 
STS-29 18 100 23 132 
STS-28R 13 60 20 76 
STS-34 17 51 18 53 
STS-33R 21 107 21 118 
STS-32R 13 111 15 120 
.
STS-36 
STS-31R
17 
13
61 
47
19 
14
81 
63 
STS-41 13 64 16 76 
STS-38 7 70 8 81 
STS-35 15 132 17 147 
STS-37 7 91 10 113 
STS-39 14 217 16 238 
STS-40 23 153 25 197 
STS-43 24 122 25 131 
STS-48 14 100 25 182 
STS-44 6 74 9 101 
STS-45 18 122 22 172 
STS-49 6 55 11 114 
STS-50 28 141 45 184 
STS-46 11 186 22 236 
STS-47 3 48 11 108 
AVERAGE 15.0 90.4 22.4 125.0 
SIGMA .	 7.6 46.6 11.1 56.1 
STS-52 152 16 290
*
MISSIONS  STS-23,24,25,26,26R, 27R, 30R, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS 
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES 
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The Orbiter lower surface tiles sustained a total of 152 hits, 
of which six had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. The 
distribution of tile damage hits does not suggest a single 
source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of ice and/or 
TPS debris from random sources.
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation 
. ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was 
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was 
opened.
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S A section of the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical purge seal and closeout foam was still attached to the interface plate/disconnect. The 
missing section was visible in the separation camera films. 
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation 
S	 ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was 
opened.
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0The majority of tile V070-395093-016 was missing from the base 
heat shield between SSME #2 and #3. This tile, which covered a S calorimeter, sustained an in-plane failure leaving the strain isolation pad (SIP) and an attached layer of densified tile 
material in the cavity.
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Hazing on the Orbiter windows was light and considered to be 
less than usual. A large number of tile impact sites (72 with 2 
. larger than 1-inch) occurred on the perimeter tiles around the 
forward facing windows. Most of the hits were small and shallow 
in depth.
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Inspection of Runway 33 immediately after landing revealed 
a tile gap filler from the left aft fuselage sidewall. 
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Fourth  use of the Orbiter drag chute occurred normally. A tile 
on the lower (-Z) right edge of the drag chute compartment 
. opening was slightly damaged by separation of the chute 
compartment door. Similar damage has been observed after every 
previous use of the drag chute.
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0	 8.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS 
A total of eleven samples were obtained from OV-102 Columbia 
during the STS-52 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy 
Space Center (ref. Figure 14). The eleven submitted samples 
consisted of 9 window wipes (Windows 1-8 and 11) and 2 samples 
from HRSI tile damage sites. The samples were analyzed by the 
NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material 
composition and comparison to known STS materials. Debris 
analysis involves the placing and correlating of particles with 
respect to composition, thermal (mission) effects, and 
availability. Debris sample results and analyses are listed by 
Orbiter location in the following summaries. 
Orbiter Windows 
Results of the window sample analysis revealed the presence of 
the following materials: 
1. Metallics 
2. RTV, silica-rich tile, insulation glass fibers 
3. Paints, primer, rust 
4. Organics 
5. Earth compounds 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Metallic particles (brass, aluminum, and carbon steel 
alloys) are common to SRB/BSM exhaust residue, but are 
not considered to be a debris concern in this quantity 
(micrometer) and have not generated a known debris 
effect. 
2. RTV, silica-rich tile, andinsulation glass fibers 
originate from Orbiter thermal protection system (TPS). 
3. Paints and primer are of flight hardware/facility/GSE 
origin; rust is an SRB BSM exhaust residue. 
4. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(Infrared Spectroscopy) method; results are pending. 
This detailed process is more difficult due to small 
sample quantity. 
5. Earth compounds (alpha-quartz, calcite, and salt 
components) originate from the landing site. 
. 
S
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Orbiter HRSI Tile Damage Sites 
Results of the Orbiter HRSI tile damage site samples indicated 
the presence of the following materials: 
1. Dense and fibrous tile material 
2. Dense Silicon Carbide 
3. Paint 
4. Earth compounds 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Dense and fibrous tile material originate from Orbiter 
thermal protection system (TPS) 
2. Dense Silicon Carbide was evaluated by Orbiter TPS 
engineering and determined the origin to be OML coating 
of gap filler. This material is applied in liquid form 
to the exposed edge of gap filler for heat protection. 
3. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin 
4. Earth compounds (calcite and salt components) 
originated from the landing site 
STS-47 Organic Analysis 
Results of the STS-47 Organic Analysis indicated the presence 
of the following materials: 
1. Polymeric 
2. Rubbery 
3. Fibrous 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Polymeric materials included items with amide, 
polyamide, aromatic polyamide, and cellulosic 
characteristics. This variety is similar to that 
observed in STS-46 samples and appear to originate 
from Orbiter window protective covers 
2. Rubbery materials were found to be methyl silicone, as 
in red RTV, and a calcium carbonate filled adhesive/ 
sealant most likely from the protective window covers. 
3. Fibrous material detected in this sampling set were 
cellulosic in nature and probably of sample cloth 
origin.	 0 
[11 
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0	 Conclusions 
The STS-52 mission sustained Orbiter tile damage to a greater 
than average degree. However, the chemical analysis results 
from post flight samples did not point to a single source of 
damaging debris. 
Orbiter window samples provided evidence of SRB BSM exhaust, 
Orbiter. TPS, landing site products, organics, and paint. 
Window polish residue, a material that has been previously 
detected, was not observed in this mission's chemical sampling 
results. 
The variety of residuals attributed to known sources did not 
seem to change significantly when compared to previous sample 
data (reference Figure 21). Included in this report are the 
results of the STS-47 organic analysis. The results of this 
analysis are similar to that of previous missions in that new 
entries do not appear to be related to a debris problem. 
A new finding in one of the two HRSI tile damage site samples 
was the presence of Silicon Carbide. This material was 
evaluated by KSC Orbiter TPS engineering and is believed to 
originate from the OML gap filler coating. Additional 
laboratory testing is planned to characterize the residual 40  deposits of the TPS materials. 
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9.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
Based on the debris inspections and film/video review, ten Post 
Launch Anomalies, but no IFA candidates, were observed on the 
STS-52 mission. 
9.1 LAUNCH PAD/FACILITY 
1. The GH2 vent arm retracted and latched properly. However, 
excessive slack was present in the static retract lanyard 
causing it to contact one of the carrier plate legs. 
9.2 EXTERNAL TANK 
1. A 5-inch divot to substrate was present in the LH2 tank 
acreage at XT-1399 adjacent to a previously sanded area. 
2. Some of the left bipod jack pad TPS closeout was missing. 
3. Foam was missing from the aft outboard corner of the left 
bipod ramp closeout. 
4. At least 20 small pieces of TPS were missing from intertank 
stringers forward of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange/bipod 
area. No metal substrate/primer was visible.
	 0 
9.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
1. The RH frustum had 18 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and was 
missing a 1.5-inch diameter area of TPS in the -Y+Z quadrant at 
the 336 ring frame. The LH frustum had 27 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners and two MSA-2 acreage debonds. 
2. Two MSA-2 acreage debonds were present on the RE SRB forward 
skirt. 
3. EPON shim was missing from the HDP #3 and #8 aft skirt feet 
prior to water impact. The substrate was charred/sooted. 
9.4 ORBITER 
1. An 8"x6"x0.5" tile damage site was present on the base heat 
shield adjacent to SSME#1 (at approximately the 7:00 o'clock 
position). This damage site appeared to have been caused by a 
dense, rigid object and may have been caused by the lost tile.
	 * 
2. A tile gap filler (V070-395052-175) from the LH aft fuselage 
sidewall was found on the runway after landing.
	 0 
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary 
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December 17, 1992 
The following Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space Center NSTS 
Photographic and Television Analysis Project, STS-52 Final Report, and was completed 
December 16, 1992. Publication numbers are LESC-30549 and JSC-25994-52. The actual 
document can be obtained through the LESC library/333-6594 or Christine Dailey /483-5336 
of the NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project. 
Christine Dailey, Sup isor' / 
Image Analysis Section 
El 
El 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
0	 2.1	 Debris 
2.1.1	 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition 
2.1.1.1	 Ice Debris Strikes at the Orbiter/ET Umbilical Area 
(Cameras E-31, OTV-109, OTV-163) 
-	 Cameras E-31 and OTV- 109 showed multiple pieces of ice debris striking the LH2 
umbilical electrical cable tray just after SSME ignition. Ice was also seen to strike the 
lower edge of the umbilical well door during this time frame. No visible damage to the 
SLY was apparent at either location. These events were reported to the Mission 
Evaluation Room (MER). 
2.1.1.2	 LH2 and L02 Umbilical Disconnect Debris 
(Cameras E-1, E-5, E-6, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-25, E-26, E-31, 
E-34, E-40, E-52, E-57, E-79, OTV-109, OTV-150, OTV-163, OTV-
171) 
The usual amount of ice debris from the L02 and LH2 TSM T-0 umbilicals as well as the 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals were noted on many of the MLP camera films and videos. Multiple 
pieces of ice and/or liquid were also seen falling from the flange of the LH2 17 inch line at 
liftoff. No follow up action was expected. 
2.1.2	 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition 
.	 2.1.2.1	 Square-shaped Debris falls near LH2 TSM Area 
(Cameras E-18, E-76, E-77) 
A small light-colored piece of debris was seen falling below the LH2 TSM T-0 disconnect 
on the E-18 film. (See Figure 2.1.2.1). A small orange-colored piece of debris was also 
seen falling by the vertical stabilizer on views from both Cameras E-76 and E-77. 
Analysis indicated that this was the same object first seen on the E-18 film. 
KSC has positively identified this debris as a yellow GSE teflon shim. This shim is used 
for protecting the orbiter TPS in localized areas when adhesive is applied to the T-0 
interface plate peripheral seal. Film from Cameras E-34, E-35, E-36 and E-40 (all of 
which showed the LH2 TSM area during the launch sequence) had been re-screened in an 
earlier effort to identify possible sources of the debris. None were found. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
.
Figure 2.1.2.1	 Square-shaped Debris falls from the 1,112 TSM Area 
at Liftoff 
The object seen on the E- 18 film measured 2 inches square and was light in color on both 
sides (although one side appeared darker than the other). A trajectory plot was not 
constructed because of the unknown effects of airflow patterns in the region of interest. 
However, KSC later reported that the object was a teflon shim that had been left on the 
pad. The film from Camera E-18 was reviewed with a lead engineer from the JSC 
Thermal Subsystem Section/ES32. No further image analysis has been requested. 
S
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.1.2.2	 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7) 
(Cameras E-3, E-7, E-8, E-9, E-10, E-11, E-12, E-13, E-14, E-15, 
E-16, E-25) 
Multiple pieces of debris were seen coming from the SRB flame duct at the time of liftoff. 
These objects were not seen traveling toward the orbiter nor were they considered to be 
fast-moving. This event has been seen on previous missions and no follow-up analysis is 
anticipated. 
2.1.2.3	 Ice Debris at GH2 Vent Arm Retraction 
(Camera E-33) 
Ice was seen on the GH2 vent arm carrier plate disconnect. Multiple pieces of white 
debris (probably ice) were seen to fall from the GH2 vent arm during retraction. None of 
the ice debris appeared to strike the vehicle. No further analysis is expected. 
Figure 2.1.2.3	 Ice Noted on GH2 Vent Arm Carrier Plate 
Ice/frost was noted on and around the umbilical carrier plate prior to the launch sequence. 
S
	 KSC reported that the amount of ice was not excessive. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
•	 2.1.3
	 Debris after Liftoff 
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the SLV from liftoff through ascent on the 
launch tracking views. Debris falling aft of the SLV after liftoff has been seen on films and 
videos from all previous missions. Most of this type of debris has been attributed to ice from 
the ET/Orbiter umbilicals or RCS paper. None of the debris seen after liftoff appeared to 
strike the vehicle. 
2.1.3.1	 SLV Debris from Tower Clear through Roll Maneuver 
(Cameras E-52, E-54, E-57) 
Several pieces of light-colored debris (probably ice) were seen falling from the ET/Orbiter 
umbilical area into the SSME exhaust plume just after tower clear on Cameras E-52, E-54 and 
E-57. On views from Cameras E-52 and E-54, red debris (probably RCS paper from the 
forward thrusters) fell along both sides of the orbiter into the SSME plume during the roll 
maneuver. 
2.1.3.2	 Red Debris near SSME Exhaust Plume at 21 seconds MET

(Cameras E-212, E-213, E-220, E-222, E-223) 
Cameras E-212, E-213, E-220, E-222 and E-223 showed several pieces of red debris 
(possibly baggy material from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals) falling aft into the SSME exhaust 
plume between 20.9 and 21.3 seconds MET. Similar events have been seen on previous 
mission films. No further analysis is expected. 
40
2.1.3.3 	 White Debris seen beneath Left Inboard Elevon at 22 
seconds MET 
(Cameras E-54, KTV4B) 
A large piece of white debris was first noted below the left inboard elevon at 
296:17:10:01.436 UTC on Camera KTV-4B. This same piece of debris was also seen falling 
aft of the left OMS pod at 296:17:10:01.499 UTC on Camera E-54. The debris did not appear 
to strike the vehicle. The origin of the object could not be identified from either view. 
S
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. 
	
Figure 2.1.3.3	 Large Piece of White Debris seen below Left 
Inboard Elevon after Roll Maneuver 
A large piece of white debris was seen below the left inboard elevon traveling from left to 
right in the field-of-view at about 22 seconds MET. A source could not be determined from 
the available views. The object did not appear to strike the vehicle. 
On Camera E-213 multiple pieces of baggie material were seen to originate from the 
ET/Orbiter umbilical area and travel aft after the roll maneuver. Approximately 3 seconds 
later, a piece of orange debris, possibly baggie material, was seen to travel from the 
RSRB exhaust plume area toward the SSME exhaust plume. A small piece of light-
colored debris was also noted falling aft along the left side of the LSRB plume at 
296:17:10:20.118 UTC on film from Camera E-222. A large piece of white debris was 
seen aft of SSME #1 at 296:17:10:46.118 UTC on both KTV-13 and ET-208. None of 
this debris was seen to strike the SLy. 
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•	
2.2	 MLP Events 
2.2. 1	 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-burning Hydrogen) 
(Task #13) 
(Cameras E-2, E-3, E-19, E-20, E-76, E-77) 
Orange vapor (possibly free-burning hydrogen) was noted beneath SSME #1 —1.87 
seconds prior to SSME #1 ignition (formation of mach diamond). (See Figure 2.2.1). 
Since free burning hydrogen is essentially colorless, engineers who reviewed films after 
the STS-38 mission believed that the orange cloud occurred due to impurities in the vapor. 
Similar events have been seen on twelve of the past nineteen missions. A comparison of 
this event with occurrences from earlier missions was performed. The amount and 
position of the vapor appeared similar to that seen on STS-35. See Appendix D Task #13 
for analysis details.	 - 
Figure 2.2.1	 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-Burning Hydrogen) Noted 
under the SSME #1 Bell just prior to SSME Ignition 
This view from the E-2 film shows both a column of orange vapor beneath SSME #1 as well 
as a cloud beneath SSME #2. On some earlier missions, the orange vapor has been seen 
rising above the SSME bells. 
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2.2.2	 Flashes in SSME Plumes after SSME Ignition 
(Cameras E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-62) 
At least three orange/white flashes were noted in the SSME #1 and #2 plumes after 
ignition while the orbiter was still on the pad. The flashes in SSME #1 were timed at 
296:17:09:36.356 UTC (T-2.658 seconds) and 296:17:09:39.252 UTC (T+0.238 
seconds) as seen on Camera E-2. The flash in SSME #2 was timed at 296:17:09:37.128 
UTC (T-1.886 seconds) on the same film. (See Figure 2.2.2). Flashes in the SSME 
plumes just after SSME ignition have been noted on ten of the past sixteen missions. 
While this event has not been considered anomalous in the past, future missions will be 
monitored for unusual occurrences or excessive numbers of flashes. 
Figure 2.2.2	 Flash in SSME #2 Plume 2 Seconds before Liftoff 
An orange flash in the SSME #2 plume was visible at 296:17:09:37.128 UTC. 
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S2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.2.3	 Base Heat Shield Erosion I*	 (Cameras E-17, E-18, E-19) 
At least six occurrences of TPS erosion were noted at the base of SSME #2 and #3. (See 
Figure 2.2.3). Minor TPS erosion has been seen on nearly all previous missions. The 
erosion visible on this mission does not appear to be related to the tile damage noted at 
landing (see Section 2.5.2). No follow up action is expected. 
Figure 2.2.3	 TPS Erosion noted on Base Heat Shield 
At least three chips are visible near the base of SSME #3 on this view of the aft end of the 
-	 orbiter. This occurrence is believed to result from the vibrations caused by SSME ignition. 
S
STS-52 Final Report
'-..'. L.•l'•7._. r. 
COLOR iOTOGRAPH
2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
• 2.3	 Ascent Events 
2.3.1	 Loose Thermal Curtain Tape on both SRBs 
(Cameras E-2, E-3, E-5, E-7, E-13, E-25, E-31, E-52, ET-2]2) 
Loose tape was seen on both the LSRB and RSRB thermal curtains after liftoff. (See 
Figure 2.3.3). This event has now been seen on four missions since reflight. No further 
analysis is planned. 
S
I 
Figure 2.3.1	 Loose Tape on LSRB Thermal Curtain 
A loose tape was visible on the LSRB as the aft end of the SLV passed through the field-
of-view during the early stages of ascent. Another piece of loose tape was seen on the 
RSRB thermal curtain in a different film. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
.	 2.3.2	 Orange Tint in SSME Plume after Roll Maneuver 
(Task #12) 
(Cameras E-208, E-222) 
An orange tint was noted in the SSME plume starting at 296:17:10:07.203 UTC (28.189 
seconds MET). This may have been due to unusual lighting conditions. KSC stated that 
this effect resulted from a normal interaction of the SSME and SRB exhaust plumes. 
A study of the five previous missions (STS-29, STS-37, STS-43, STS-46 and STS-.50) 
launched at approximately the same time of day and at the same inclination angle as STS-
52 was conducted. Only the E-208 film from STS-29 showed the appearance of an 
orange tint in the SSME plume. See Appendix D Task #12 for analysis details. 
2.3.3	 Flares in SSME Exhaust Plume 
(Cameras E-54, E-207, E-208, E-212, E-213, E-218, E-222, E-223, 
ET-212, KTV4B) 
At least seven orange-colored flares were noted in the SSME plumes from about 17 seconds 
MET to 34 seconds MET on Camera E-218. Flares during this time period have been seen on 
several earlier missions. Flares on earlier missions have been attributed to RCS paper burning 
up in the plume. No follow up action is expected. 
2.3.4	 Body Flap Motion (Task #4) 
(Cameras E-207, E-220) 
Slight body flap motion was seen at around 38 seconds MET on Cameras E-207 and E-
.	 220. Small amounts of body flap and elevon motion were also noted at the time of SSME 
and SRB ignition. Body flap, vertical stabilizer and wing motion have all been seen on 
previous mission films. The magnitude of motion seen on the views was not sufficient to 
warrant further analysis. Documentation can be found in Appendix D, Task #4. 
2.3.5	 Linear Optical Effect 
(Cameras E-208, E-212, ET-208, KTV-13) 
A single linear optical distortion was noted during ascent at 296:17:10:30.803 UTC on 
several tracking cameras. Linear optical effects have been seen on fifteen of the past 
sixteen missions. In the past, JSC engineers have attributed this event to shock waves 
distorting the refractive index of the atmosphere during ascent. No follow up action has 
been requested. 
2.3.6	 Bright puffs near SRB plume 
(Camera E7'-207) 
Bright objects were seen near the left edge of the SRB plume aft of the vehicle on Camera 
ET-207 at 296:17:10:50.202 UTC. This effect was possibly due to mixing of the SRB 
and SSME plumes. No further analysis is expected. 
I]
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2.3.7	 Recirculation (Task #1) 
(Cameras ET-204, ET-208, ET-212, KTV-13, E-204, E-205, 
E-208, E-212)	 0 
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLY prior to SRB 
separation has been seen on nearly all previous missions. For STS-52, the start of 
recirculation was observed at about 92 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 
113 seconds MET on Camera E-208. See Appendix D Task #1 for a summary of 
recirculation start and stop times for all missions since reflight. 
CAMERA START (seconds MET) STOP (seconds MET) 
ET-204 - - 
ET-208 92 111 
ET-212 - - 
KTV-13 92 112 
E-204 - - 
E-205 - - 
E-208 92 113 
E-212 frame 5400 frame 6500
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION 
NOTE: Intermittent LOV due to the SRB and SSME plumes prevented 
acquisition of specific start and stop times for recirculation on 
camera ET-204, ET-212, E-204 and E-205. 
2.3.8	 Dark Puffs in SRB Plume before SRB Separation

(Cameras E-205, E-207, ET-207) 
At least six dark puffs were noted in the SRB exhaust plume just prior to SRB separation 
(around 112 seconds MET). Similar events have been noted on STS-34, STS-39 and 
STS-47. No follow up action is expected. 
2.4	 DTO-0312 Analysis 
2.4.1	 Analysis of Onboard Umbilical Well Photography (Task #5) 
2.4.1.1	 16 mm Views of SRB Separation 
(Magazines 68 - 5 mm lens and 69- 10 mm lens) 
Separation of the LSRB from the external tank appeared normal on the 16 mm umbilical 
well film views No anomalies were observed on the LSRB surface areas. Multiple divots 
and chipped areas were visible on the base of the electric cable tray. A nearly square-
shaped piece of light colored debris was noted approximately 3 seconds prior to the SRB 
separation. A dark, irregularly-shaped piece of debris was seen to come from behind the 
electric cable tray at approximately 2.4 seconds prior to the separation. A smear appeared 
in the upper left corner of the field-of-view at approximately 0.88 seconds prior to 
separation (5 mm camera film). The aft ET/Orbiter attach brace and the ET aft dome 
show charring similar to that seen on previous mission umbilical films.
C 
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Figure 4.4. 1.1	 16 mm \ ie (10 mm Lens) of' I SRB Separation 
Numerous pieces of small debris were seen in the 16 mm umbilical camera film views of 
the LSRB before, during, and after SRB separation. The debris appeared to be small 
pieces of TPS that had ablated off the external tank. 
2.4.1.2	 16 mm Views of ET Separation 
(Magazines 68 - 5 mm lens and 69 - 10 mm lens) 
The ET/Orbiter umbilicals appeared normal during the ET separation sequence. 
White debris (probably ice) of various sizes and shapes were seen before, during, and 
after ET separation on the 16mm umbilical camera films. Two dark, fast-moving pieces 
of debris were seen in the umbilical purge vapors prior to ET separation. 
The events seen in the separation sequence of the external tank are similar to the events 
seen on the previous mission umbilical well camera films. 
.
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
Figure 2.4.1.2 (A)	 Ice from Forward Purge Vent Tube Visible at ET 
Separation 
A single, large, white cylindrical-shaped piece of debris was seen to travel across the FOV 
just before ET separation. KSC reported that this debris was an ice finger from a forward 
purge vent tube. 
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Figure 2.4.1.2 (B)	 LH2 ET Umbilical at ET Separation 
A small piece of foam like material moved across the ET LH2 umbilical just after ET 
separation (1). A blistered appearance to the TPS on the left side of the LM umbilical 
was visible as the ET began to move away from the Orbiter (2). Ice was visible in the 
orifice of the LH2 17 inch line as the LH2 umbilical came into full view (3). The bushing 
sleeves appeared to be present in their proper positions (4). (The cylindrical-shaped 
debris object seen on the STS-40 umbilical well film was believed to have been a 
dislodged bushing sleeve). 
2.4.1.3	 35 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of the ET 
Separation 
The external tank nose cone, L02 acreage PAL ramps and the ET aft dome acreage 
appeared normal on the 35 mm umbilical well camera views. The SRB BSM bum scars 
on the 0-give were typical of previous mission views. Small white marks or chipping of 
the TPS on the ramp over the electric cable tray and pressurization line just above the L02 
umbilical were visible. Small white marks on the tank TPS were also visible to the right 
S
STS-52 Final Report
111
,., r.	 I 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
C2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
(in the FOV) of the L02 umbilical and on the forward end of the ET/Orbiter aft attach 
strut. 
Figure 2.4.1.3	 Small White Marks/Divots seen on ET +y TPS 
A divot was seen on the LH2 tank TPS approximately ten feet below the intertank closeout 
line (+Z axis to the left of the L02 feedline). The divot was estimated to be approximately 
six inches in size (1). 
Small white marks were visible under the ET/Orbiter forward attach biped (one possible 
small divot) in the area of the left bipod jack pad and ramp TPS closeout (2). Small white 
"popcorn" marks were seen on the intertank TPS above the forward biped (3). The larger 
divots that have been seen near the forward ET/Orbiter attach biped, along the intertank 
close-out, and on the intertank TPS on previous mission films were not visible on the 
STS-52 tank. (A large divot under the forward bipod was declared an inflight anomaly on 
STS-47). 
Detailed analysis on the umbilical well films can be found in Appendix D Task #5. 
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0	 2.4.2	 Onboard Handheld Camera ET Analysis (Task #6) (Photographs 52-42-01 thru 5242-36) 
DTO-03 12 Method 3 was performed aboard STS-52. This method incorporates use of a 300 
mm lens on a Nikon F4 camera body. The photographs were taken between 17:27:35 
(approximately 10 minutes after ET separation) and 17:33:40 UTC by astronaut Lacy Veech. 
At the time of the first photograph, the ET was approximately 2.52 km from the orbiter. The 
photographs were screened shortly after landing. The photographs were generally too dark to 
perform a detailed analysis. Each frame was well focused and contained GMT time. The 
photographs were backlit, which means that the available light was not reflecting from the ET 
but rather was directly in the camera's field-of-view. 
Figure 2.4.2	 Possible Divots on the LH2/Intertank Interface 
The detailed screening revealed two possible divots in the LH2 intertank interface on the 
+Y axis. The ET tumbled at approximately 0. 124 revolutions per minute about a plane 
which intersected the optic axis. Updates to the DTO-03 12 have been incorporated into 
the next mission's procedures that should increase the quality of the photography. 
.
	
Detailed notes for all the photographic screening are located in Appendix D Task #6. 
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2.5	 Landing Events 
2.5.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3) 
2.5.1.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film
(Cameras EL-9, EL-12) 
Camera EL-9 film was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. The distance between the 
left and right inboard tires was used to scale the measurements. Data was gathered from 
approximately one second prior to landing through touchdown. A point on both the top of the left 
and right inboard main landing gear wheels was digitized for 100 frames. This raw data was 
corrected for the vertical change in scale at each frame. The vertical distance between the top of 
the wheel in the first frame and each subsequent frame was computed and a linear regression was 
applied on this normalized vertical distance vs. time data to find the actual sink rate. This rate was 
determined to be 1.7 ft/sec. which is well within the current threshold limits. 
Nose gear touchdown occurred approximately 18 seconds after main gear touchdown. Camera 
EL- 12 was used to determine the nose gear sink rate. The nose wheel itself was used to scale the 
measurements. Data was gathered for approximately one second prior to nose gear touchdown. 
Three points on every other frame over a period of 148 frames were digitized. These points 
consisted of the top and bottom of the nose wheel and a point on the runway surface immediately 
beneath the nose gear. This raw data was corrected for the vertical change in scale at each frame. 
The distance between the bottom of the wheel and the runway was computed and a linear 
regression was applied on this normalized vertical distance vs. time data to find the actual sink 
rate. This rate was determined to be 2.6 ft/sec. which is also well within the current threshold 
limits. 0	 Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in Appendix D Task #3. 
2.5.1.2	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video 
(Camera KTV-33L) 
Sink rate was calculated for the main gear of the vehicle using a single camera solution. 
Positional information was acquired by digitizing the landing sequence and then obtaining a 
screen dump of cursor positions at the points of interest. The positional information was then 
scaled to actual position and a linear least squares line was fitted through these points as a 
function of time. The main gear sink rate was calculated to be 1.1 feet per second. A sink 
rate plot is located in Appendix D Task 3. No follow-up action has been requested. 
See Appendix D Task #3 for details. 
Results from the film analysis are considered better than video because of the higher spatial 
resolution. 
2.5.2	 Damaged Base Heat Shield Tile Between SSMEs #2 and #3 
(Task #14) 
A large portion of tile V070-39509.3-016 was missing from the base heat shield between 
SSMEs #2 and #3. (See Figure 2.5.2). According to KSC, the tile suffered an in-plane 
•	 failure leaving the strain isolation pad and densified tile material in the cavity. An In Flight 
Anomaly (IFA) has been declared to document this discrepancy. 
.
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Womp 
Figure 2.5.2	 Damage to Base Heat Shield Tile seen during 
Post Landing Inspection 
A large portion of this base heat shield tile (V070-395093-016) between SSMEs #2 and 
#3 appears to be missing. This picture, taken during the post-flight inspection, shows the 
exposed calorimeter and some of the residual tile material still in the cavity. 
Launch films were reviewed to determine whether or not the tile in question was visible 
during the launch and ascent phases of the mission. The majority of evidence indicated that 
the tile was still present through tower clear. Beyond that time frame, film resolution of the 
area in question made further analysis inconclusive. See Appendix D Task #14 for details. 
In addition to the missing tile, damage was present on the base heat shield adjacent to SSME 
#1 (near the 7:00 o'clock position). According to KSC, this damage may have been caused 
by the lost tile. 
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2.5.3
(Task #9) 
(Cameras EL-07, EL-07a, 
EL-is)
EL-010, EL-09, EL-09a, EL-12, 
Drag Chute Performance 
2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
The landing of Columbia at the end of mission STS-52 marked the fourth deployment of 
the Orbiter drag chute. The drag chute initiated 13.763 seconds after main gear 
touchdown. While in the reefed configuration, the chute stayed near the vehicle centerline 
near a heading angle of - i degree and a riser angle of 7 degrees; however, after disreefing, 
the drag chute move to the vehicle's left side. The heading angle oscillated, having a 
minimum of -10 degrees before eventually returning to a maximum of 3 degrees. The 
riser angle had a minimum of -8 degrees and a maximum of 1 degree during this time 
interval. The maximum drag chute deflection along the vehicle's y-axis was 
approximately 15 feet (4.6 meters). The drag chute was released 44.205 seconds after 
touchdown. At drag chute release, the heading angle was approximately -4 degrees and 
the riser angle was approximately -5 degrees. All heading and riser angle measurements 
are relative to the Orbiter's x-axis. 
An attempt to measure the deceleration of the vehicle between full inflation reefed 
configuration to chute release from visual data indicated an average deceleration of 3.2 
feet/sec2 (0.98 meters/sec2). The velocity of the vehicle was found to range from 
approximately 282 feet/sec (86.0 meters/sec) to approximately 79 feet/sec (24 meters/sec) 
over the near 29 second time interval of data taken. 
Graphical representation of the data described may be found in Appendix D, Task 9. 
•2.6
	
Other Normal Events 
Other events seen on the STS-52 launch views that have been seen on previous shuttle 
flights include: smoke from the hydrogen ignitors during startup; RCS paper in the SSME 
plume at startup; frost buildup around the umbilical baggie area and the ET vent louvers; 
normal pad debris; butcher paper debris from the RCS ports; mWtiple pieces of MLP 
debris in the exhaust plume after liftoff; ET aft dome outgassing; vapor from both SRB 
stiffener rings; acoustic waves during liftoff; RCS paper and normal debris seen during 
roll maneuver, overshoot of the roll maneuver, RCS paper debris in the SSME plume after 
roll maneuver, expansion waves after roll maneuver, slight charring of the ET aft dome; 
condensation around the SLY; SRB exhaust plume brightening at tail off; and slag noted 
after SRB separation. 
S
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I.	 INTRODUCTION 
Space Shuttle Mission STS-52, the thirteenth flight of the 
Orbiter Columbia was conducted October 22, 1992 at approximately 
12:09 P.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch Complex 39B 
(LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive 
photographic and video coverage was provided and has been 
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight 
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are 
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch 
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and 
downrange tracking sites. 
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES: 
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis 
objectives for STS-52 included, but were not limited to the 
following. 
a. Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for 
anomaly detection 
b. 
•
Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems 
c. Determination of SRB PlC firing time and SRB 
separation time 
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
integrity 
e. Correct operation of the following: 
1.	 Hoiddown post blast covers 
2.	 SSME ignition 
3.	 LH2 and L02 17" disconnects 
4.	 GH2 umbilical 
5.	 TSM carrier plate umbilicals 
6.	 Free hydrogen ignitors 
7.	 Vehicle clearances 
S.	 -GH2 vent line retraction and latch back 
9.	 Vehicle motion
There was one special test objective for this mission. 
a. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation 
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT: 
Film was received from fifty-six of fifty-seven requested 
cameras as well as video from twenty-four of twenty-four 
requested cameras. The following table illustrates the camera 
data received at MSFC for STS-52. 
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16mm	 35mm	 Video 
!4LP 22 0 4 
FSS 7 •0 3 
Perimeter 2 3 6 
Tracking 0 16 11 
Onboard 4 2 o
Totals	 35	 21	 24 
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is 
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments 
of the video products received at MSFC. 
a. Ground Camera Coverage: 
Photographic coverage of STS-52 was considered good. 
Coverage from some tracking cameras was limited due to cloud 
coverage. Camera E-65 jammed while starting providing no data. 
Camera E-218 malfunctioned, providing a short run, with no loss 
of data. Camera E-54 was shipped as E-59 and E-59 shipped as E-
54. Some of the video cameras also experienced distorted video 
signals during launch. 
b. Onboard Camera Assessment: 
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the 
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly. 
However, camera E-301 did not record water impact. Also, the 
astronauts carried a 35mm hand-held camera to record film for 
evaluating the ET TPS integrity after ET separation. Two 16mm 
motion picture cameras and one 35mm still camera were flown on 
this mission in the Orbiter's umbilical well to record the SRB 
and ET separation events. 
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS: 
a. General Observations: 
While viewing the film, several events were noted which 
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and 
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the 
SSNE plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnect and umbilicals; 
and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent, 
which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detectors, purge 
123 
•	 barrier material and SRB thermal curtain tape. 
b. Loose Thermal Curtain Tape: 
Figures one and two are frames of film from cameras E-5 and 
If	 E-13 respectively. These figures show one piece of loose thermal 
curtain tape on the right SRB (camera E-5) and one piece on the 
left SRB (camera E-13). 
c. T-O Umbilical Debris: 
Figure three is a frame of film from camera E-18 showing a 
piece of debris which fell from the LH2 T-O umbilical as it 
retracted from the vehicle. The debris object was square in 
shape and light colored. It is estimated that the object is 
about 2 inches in size. This debris was identified, post flight, 
as a yellow GSE teflon shim. 
d. Pad Debris Striking SRB: 
Figure four is a film frame showing a piece of pad debris 
from the SRB blast hole which strikes the base of the left SRB 
systems tunnel. There was no apparent damage to the vehicle. 
e. ET TPS Divots: 
•
	
	 Figure five is a film frame showing one divot noted near the 
center of the LH2 tank near the LOX line. Figure six is a film 
frame showing several small divots noted on the right side of the 
bipod on the intertank. These divots were recorded on the 35mm 
still camera located in the Orbiter's L02 umbilical well. 
V.	 ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS: 
a. T-Zero Times: 
T-Zero times were determined from cameras which view the 
SRB hoiddown posts numbers 14-1, 14-2, M-5 and 14-6. These cameras 
record the explosive bolt combustion products. 
POST	 CAMERA POSITION
14-1 E-9 
14-2 E-8 
14-5 E-12 
M-6 E-13
TIME (UTC) 
296:17:09:39.017 
296:17:09:39.017 
296:17:09:39.016 
296:17:09:39.017 
.
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b. ET Tip Deflection: 	 0 Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined 
to be approximately 30.3 inches. Figure five is a data plot 
showing the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal 
and vertical directions. These data were derived from camera 
E-79.
C. SRB Separation Time:
KI 
SRB separation time for STS-52 was determined to be 
296:17:11:42.17 UTC taken from camera E-207.
. 
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Figure 6
Several Small Divots Noted on Right Side of the Bipod on the Intertank 
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Space Transportation Systems Division S	 Rockwell International Corporation 12214 Lakewood Boulevard Downey, California 90241 
December 4, 1992
Rockwell 
International 
In Reply Refer to 92MA521 7 
&
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA) 
Contract NAS9-1 8500, System Integration, Transmittal of the Rockwell 
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-52 Mission. 
The System Integration Contractor hereby submits the Engineering 
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with 
- the Space Shuttle 
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document (NSTS 08244). 
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated 
to determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) 
providing this coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39B Fixed Service S	 Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and uprange and downrange tracking sites for the STS-52 launch conducted on 
October 22, 1992, at approximately 10:09 AM (PDT) from the Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC) and for the landing on November 1, 1992 at KSC (6:05 AM PST). 
Rockwell received launch films from 81 cameras (59 cine, 22 video) and landing 
films from 22 cameras (16 sine, 6 video) to support the STS-52 photographic 
evaluation effort. 
All ground camera coverage for this mission including coverage on the MLP, 
FSS and tracking cameras were good.
	 - 
Overall, the films showed STS-52 to be a clean flight. Sever Al pieces of ice from 
the ET/ORB umbilicals were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to 
the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. 1
 The usual 
condensation and water vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB 
stiffener rings and dissipated after the completion of the roll maneuver. No 
vapor was observed in the vicinity of the rudder/speed brake, at liftoff: Charring 
of the ET aft dome and recirculation and brightening of the SRB plumes were 
visible and normal. Booster Separation Motor (BSM) firing and SRB separation 
also appeared to be normal. 
(Packing Sheet No. D1192-22214) 
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Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge 
water was activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were 
activated at approximately 1 second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. 
All blast deflection shields closed prior to direct SRB exhaust plume 
impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and retracted as designed. The ET 
GH2 vent line carrier dropped normally and latched securely with no rebound. 
No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical hydrogen dispersal system hardware. 
STS-52 was the eleventh flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB 
holddown support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The link is 
designed to increase the plunger velocity and seating accuracy, while leaving the 
hoiddown bolt ejection velocity unchanged. This prevents frangible nut 
fragments and/or NSI cartridges from falling from the DCS, while not 
increasing the probability of a hoiddown bolt hang-up. No material was observed 
originating from the DCS area during liftoff. 
No major or significant events were observed or identified. One item that merits 
mentioning (not considered an anomaly) is the small square shaped object seen 
near the left side of the orbiter near the TSM disconnect area by MSFC. This 
event and other events noted by the Rockwell film/users during the review and 
analysis of the STS-52 photographic items are summarized in the following 
comments. These events are not considered to be a constraint to next flight. 
COMMENTS
	 0 
1. On camera E-18, E-76 and E-77, MSFC reported seeing a small square 
shaped object beneath the LH2 TSM T-O disconnect on the E-18 film. Review 
of the E-18 film by JSC and Rockwell verified the presence of this object. The 
object was light in color on both sides and estimated to be approximately two 
inches square. However, the debris object is not believed to be a tile because 
of the thin appearance in the edge views. The debris object could possibly be 
a shim, a tag, or a spacer. 
A small orange-colored piece of debris was observed on cameras E-76 and E-
77 which appeared to originate from the LH2 TSM umbilical area. Review of 
the films by JSC, MSFC, KSC and Rockwell concluded that this is the same 
debris that was seen on camera E-18. No further analysis is planned. 
2. Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen beneath SSME #1 just prior to SSME ignition on cameras E-2, E-3, E-19, E-20, E-76 and E-77. 
This vapor appears to be similar to the vapor noted on previous missions. It 
is not an issue and no follow-up action is planned.
	 --
3. White flashes were seen in the SSME #1 and #2 plumes after after SSME 
ignition and prior to liftoff (cameras E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, and E-62). 
Orange/white flashes have been observed on previous missions. No follow-
up action is planned. 
4. On cameras OTV-1 09, OTV-1 54, OTV-1 63 and OTV-1 64, multiple pieces of 
white debris (probably ice) was seen falling from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals 
at SSME ignition. Several of these particles contacted the LH2 umbilical 
cable tray, aft sill of the umbilical cavity and may have contacted the 
132
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underside of the orbiter at liftoff, but no damage to the tiles was detected. No 
follow-up action is planned. 
5. Numerous pieces of flight-colored debris seen coming from the SRB flame 
ducts at SRB ignition and liftoff( cameras E-1, E-2, E-3, E-7, E-14, E-15 and E-
25). None of the debris appeared to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action is planned.. 
6. On cameras OTV-154, E-2, E-3, E-5, E-7, E-13, E-25, E-31, E-34 and E-52, a 
piece of loose tape was noted on the right SRB and left SRB thermal curtains 
after liftoff. Loose thermal curtain tape has been on previous missions. No 
follow-up action is planned. 
7. Flexing (fore and aft motion) was noted, in the base heat shield in the 
centerline area, between the SSME cluster during the early stage of SSME 
ignition (cameras E-76 and E-77). The motion was similar to that observed 
on previous launches. No follow-up action is required. 
8. Flares and flashes seen in the SSME exhaust plume (ET-212, E-52, E-54, 
E-207, E-212, E-213, and E-222) at approximately 17.5 seconds MET and 
between 30 and 34 seconds MET. These observations have been seen in the 
SSME exhaust plumes on previous missions and are understood to be 
burning of propellant impurities including RCS paper covers. No follow-up 
action is planned. 
9. On cameras ET-207, E-205 and E-207, dark puffs were noted in the SRB 
plume at approximately 113 seconds MET (prior to plume brightening). 
Dark/orange puffs have been seen on previous missions and no follow-up 
action is planned. 
10. The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed 
on STS-52. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for information only: 
• Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area. 
• Debris (Pad, insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post areas 
and MLP. 
• Butcher paper falling from the RCS. 
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV 
prior to SRB separation. 
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME start-up. 
• Debris pieces in the SSME/SRB plumes. 
• ET aft dome outgassing and charring. 
• Slight elevon motion at SSME ignition. 
• Twang motion. 
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure (MAX-Q) 
region which appeared to have an amplitude and frequency similar to 
those of previous missions. 
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or ambient 
meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during ascent. 
• Slag in SRB plume after separation. 
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11. Cameras E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010 
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent 
clearance separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling ET 
vent umbilical structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety. 
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances 
between the left SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films 
showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies 
were observed for the SRB body trajectory. 
12. Cameras E7-16 and E27-E28 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. 
DV08P.020 requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to 
verify nozzle to holddown post drift clearance. 
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No 
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive 
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the hoiddown posts were verified. 
13. The landing of STS-52 occurred on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle landing 
facility. Good video and film coverage were obtained and no anomalous 
events were observed. This flight marked the fourth use of the Orbiter drag 
chute. The drag chute appeared to have functioned normally. During the 
post-landing inspection video views, a tile appeared to be missing between 
SSME #2 and SSME #3 on the base heat shield above the body flap. Further 
review indicated erosion of the surface coating and densified layer on a 
development flight instrumentation tile, instrumented with a calorimeter. 
It is not on issue and is considered normal wear and tear. No follow-up 
action is required. 
This letter is of particular interest to W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and J. M. Stearns 
(WE3) at JSC. The Integration Contractor contact is R. Ramon at (310) 922-3679. 
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 
Space Systems Division 
J. A. Wolfelt 
Chief Engineer 
System Integration 
RR:cl
S 
134
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
	
- 	
lorin Approved 
No. 0704-0188 
Pobtic "rpl:IIl.J flurde,, liii 1110	 -Al­ loll 	 al	 all,, In... I,,, ,seslam.,l,'d to averaqe I hour p.', W
;" 
mw 	 including the limO for ieuiew . . , ,	 1 1 'u , 110111. %­ ( i no'; a'lIllincJ dntJ 11Jun01, J..Ihl.'f.amaJ jl,d 1ll.lalaI.11lllll1j IIIO ia, a.	 101 led,	 mad 11,1 ,pIa,l na)	 lid reviewing t he • oltet lIOn 01 iolOrmn..Imor, 	 Solid coflImeoll to').,, 00.1 train bum ion 11ana,, to or ...my al II.,. .a000st ol 1111% cutlet (.0,. of all,., tn.,i IOn. •0m IuahlIImJ su.J'JentaI,ias lot . ,:du Iii,; I lIa	 burden	 to WinImIflgtCmn headquarters Setoices, IJIteclurate jut lIlt, 1,04 huh Opem .111, Ii.	 lIlt 0)4 Is,	 I) I S let leFtOil .11111 in lIojhwu.	 Oils' 1104. A, I..i.;i. ml,	 A	 112)1-1 302. aid 1.0 the O ffic e of Maimnyemev.t and 000jel. Paperw.a, k Reductiom, I'rc1jec ((0104-l)l Rb), uVanluIImyt,III, IC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave b!oisk) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
December 1992 Final	 21 Oct 1992 — 3 Nov 1992 
4. TITLE AND SUHIITLE S. FUNDING NUMBERS 
Debris/Ice/TPS Assessment and Integrated Photographic 
Analysis of Shuttle Mission STS-52 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Gregory N. Katnik 
•	 Scott A. Higginbotham 
J. Bradley Davis 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) S. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
NASA REPORT NUMBER 
External Tank Mechanical
	 Systems Division 
Mail Code: TV-MSD-22 TM 107554 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida
	 32899 
9. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/ MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
ha. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Publicly Available 
Unclassified — Unlimited 
13. ABSTRACT (Maxiinwn 20() woids)
	 7 
A Debris/Ice/TPS assessment and integrated photographic analysis was 
conducted for Shuttle Mission STS-47. Debris inspections of the flight 
elements and launch pad were performed before and after launch.
	 Ice/Frost 
conditions on the External Tank were assessed by the use of computer 
programs, nomographs, and infrared.scanner data during cryogenic loading 
of the vehicle followed by on-pad visual
	 inspection. High speed photography 
was analyzed after launch to identify ice/debris sources and evaluate 
potential vehicle damage and/or in-flight anomalies. This report documents 
the debris/jce/TPS conditions and integrated photographic analysis of 
Shuttle Mission STS-52, and the resulting effect on the Space Shuttle Program. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 
STS-52	 Ice	 Frost	 Debris  
Thermal	 Protection System (TPS)
	 Photographic Analysis 16. PRICE CODE 
17.	 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18.	 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19.	 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT 
Unclassified Unclassified
.	 Unclassified Unlimited
)t.,tldalc1 I ornt .")H (I(ev 21) 
135	 lm..',a 1,40,1 by .41151 Slit / 3') . Id 1111 hIll 
. 
KSC DEBRIS/ICE/TPS ASSESSMENT AND INTEGRATED PHOTOGRAPHIC

ANALYSIS REPORT DISTRIBUTION LIST 6/92 
NASA - KSC 
MK/B. Shaw 
TV-PEO-2/P. Weber 
TV-M5D-1/C. Stevenson 
TV-MSD-2/L. Bolton 
TV-MSD-22/G. Katnik (9) 
TE-CID-2/C. Brown 
TE-CID-21A/N. Pope 
RO/R. E. Reyes 
MK-SIO-2/C. Martin
GK-5/Z. H. Byrns 
SK/F. Huneidi 
ZK-881K. J. Mayer 
LSO-178/H. .L. Laxnberth 
LSO-437/J. Cawby 
USBI-LSS/L. Clark 
NASA -HQ 
QSO/W. Corner 
NASA - JSC
	
	
Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 7705 
VA/D. Germany 
WE3/G. I. Good 
ES3/J. Kowal 
SN3/E. Christiansen 
SN5/D. E. Pitts 
NASA - MSFC 
ED35/D. Andrews 
EE31/M. A. Pessin 
EP55/T. J. Rieckhoff 
SA32/J. G. Cavalaris 
SA31/G. C. Ladner
Marshall Space Flight 
Center 
Huntsville, AL 35812 
Rockwell - Downey	 Rockwell International 
12214 Lakewood Blvd 
AC07/J. McClyrnonds	 Downey, CA 90241 
FA44/R. Ramon 
Martin Marietta 	 13800 Old Gentilly Road 
New Orleans, Louisiana 
Dept. 3571/S. Copsey	 70129 
Dept. 3570/C. Gray 	 P. 0. Box 29304 
New Orleans, Louisiana 
70189
